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INTRODUCTION 
Malick W. Ghachem* 
This symposium offers a rare opportunity to see three of the finest minds in 
Law and Religion scholarship from both sides of the North Atlantic at work.  Held 
at the University of Maine on March 23, 2012, the symposium featured a keynote 
address by Professor Joseph Weiler of New York University Law School.1  
Professor Weiler’s remarks were occasioned by a 2011 decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in Strasbourg, Lautsi v. Italy, upholding the 
constitutionality of the display of the crucifix in Italian public school classrooms 
under the European Convention of Human Rights (“the Convention”).2  The 
principal respondents were Pierre-Henri Prélot of the University of Cergy-Pontoise 
in France and William Marshall of the University of North Carolina School of Law.  
The dialogue between these three great students of European and American 
constitutional law taps into some of the most urgent and controversial issues on the 
church/state horizon. 
In his 2005 book A Christian Europe? (published in French and Italian 
editions, among others, but not yet in English), Weiler argued that Europe should 
be able to freely embrace its Christian heritage.3  As Prélot reminds us, this 
argument was first made in connection with the 2004-2005 debates over whether to 
include a clause acknowledging the relationship between Europe and Christian 
values in the preamble of the proposed constitutional treaty of the European Union.  
That treaty was rejected by French (and later also by Dutch) voters in a May 2005 
referendum and so never came into effect.  Although keyed to that debate, Weiler’s 
book also developed a more general set of arguments about the implications for 
European identity of acknowledging or denying Europe’s Christian traditions.   
Around this same time period, the Lautsi case began winding its way up 
through the Italian court system and, eventually, towards the ECHR.  The display 
of the crucifix in Italian public schools dates back to a pair of royal decrees from 
the 1920s, and even further back to an 1859 law of the Kingdom of Piedmont-
Sardinia requiring such display.  (Piedmont-Sardinia was soon to be united into the 
new Kingdom of Italy during the Risorgimento of the 1860s that created the 
modern Italian nation.)  After the Italian Council of State sustained the 
constitutionality of this practice as a matter of Italian constitutional law in 2006, 
Lautsi, the parent of an Italian public school pupil, brought a challenge before the 
ECHR.  The ECHR Second Chamber – which we can roughly analogize to a three-
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 1. The lead organizer of the symposium was Francesca Vassallo of the University of Southern 
Maine’s History and Political Science Department.  Martin Rogoff of the University of Maine School of 
Law and myself were co-organizers.  Maine Law’s Franco-American Law Seminar, founded and 
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 2. Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011). 
 3. For the French edition, see JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, L’EUROPE CHRÉTIENNE? UNE EXCURSION 
(2007). 
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member federal appellate panel in the American system – found the display of the 
crucifix to be in violation of the Convention.  That ruling was then appealed to the 
full court of the ECHR, which reversed the Second Chamber.  Weiler argued the 
case before the en banc court on behalf of a number of third-party EU-member 
states (Italy was represented by separate counsel).4 
Weiler’s basic impulse is to raise questions about two understandings of the 
law of church and state: American neutrality and French laïcité, those distinctive 
products of the American and French revolutions, respectively.  He writes that the 
idea of “neutrality,” a longtime (if increasingly on-the defensive) backbone of 
American religious liberty law,5 is often anything but, for it tends to privilege 
secular over religious positions whenever the issue of religion’s place in the public 
square arises.  The French tradition of laïcité, in his view, has much the same 
effect, though Marshall’s point that American church-state law often struggles to 
reconcile neutrality with competing free exercise and other values suggests a less 
cozy relationship between these two traditions.   
But if not neutrality or laïcité, then what?  Mistakenly held out as a right-wing 
spokesperson for a theocratic state in some quarters, Weiler embraces the old ideal 
of toleration.  Toleration, he suggests, has come upon hard times at the hands of 
those purporting to act in its name: the inheritors of the Lockean, Madisonian, and 
Jeffersonian commitment to freedom of conscience.  Not for Weiler, the late 
eighteenth-century skepticism of George Washington that toleration as an ideal is 
sufficiently robust to protect liberty of conscience.  In a 1790 letter to the Hebrew 
Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, Washington famously dismissed the 
concept of toleration for presuming that it was only “by the indulgence of one class 
of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights.”6  The 
First Amendment religion clauses, in other words, embodied a regime of right 
rather than toleration: their operation did not depend on whether despised 
minorities of the day happened to find favor with those (temporarily) in power. 
Weiler’s most profound contribution to this debate is to encourage us to think 
about liberty of conscience not as a narrow function of the rights-bearing individual 
but rather in the broader political sense of compromise between those of religious 
and non-religious sensibilities.  The Lautsi case matters because it permits a 
reasonable constitutional reconciliation between the laïque and non-laïque states of 
Europe and so gives to the rest of the world an example of how liberal democracy 
and religious sensibilities can coexist.  He implies that this compromise will also 
protect and even advance the interests of European citizens who do not share the 
“official religions” of their states: states, that is, with modern establishment 
traditions such as Italy, Britain, and Denmark. 
On that last point much depends.  What kind of a claim is Weiler making here?  
Is it a normative thesis about the proper relationship between a national state and its 
citizens at the substantive level of religious liberty law?  When Weiler speaks of 
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 5. For a recent defense of the neutrality tradition, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013). 
 6. George Washington’s Reply to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island (Aug. 18, 
1790), http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/hebrew/reply.html.  
2013] INTRODUCTION 757 
religious liberty as a communitarian rather than individual right, he engages us at 
this level of analysis.  In other respects, however, he seems to have in mind a 
primarily structural thesis about how best to preserve state-to-state “toleration” in a 
non-federal union such as Europe’s (one that for financial reasons has seemed 
conspicuously fragile in recent times).  Prélot’s critique turns on this distinction.  
Like Marshall, he questions whether it is true that the French and American models 
of democracy entail consigning religion to the private sphere in the same way.  In 
his oral argument before the ECHR, Weiler pointedly warned the judges of the 
harms that would flow from Europe’s drift towards an American non-establishment 
pole.  Prélot’s analysis suggests that the harms at issue here are those of American-
style unitary constitutional law (one rule for all fifty states), not those of 
substantive American religious liberty law.  He concludes, regretfully, that Lautsi 
represents the end of a certain modern European tradition of separating religion 
from politics: Christianity is now a de facto part of substantive European 
constitutional law.7 
Marshall shares Prélot’s anxiety that Weiler has won the war over religion 
after losing the 2004 battle over the (failed) EU Treaty.  He is sympathetic to 
Weiler’s critique of neutrality as a misleading abstraction, but finally speaks from 
the eighteenth-century voice of Madison and Jefferson: non-establishment prevents 
the corruption of religion by governmental oversight and the division of society 
into warring religious factions, each competing with the others for public 
recognition.  Marshall associates the first of these dynamics with a revolutionary-
era, evangelical understanding of separation that is only partly captured in Weiler’s 
concept of “freedom from religion.”  The paradox of this evangelical version of 
separation is that it conceives of the secular state as an instrument for the protection 
and promotion of faith.  Locke walks hand in hand with a robust church; in this 
way the American experiment still lives as a model for getting beyond the Old 
World’s history of religious strife.   
But do free exercise and non-establishment introduce their own kind of 
competitiveness between religions?  A recent study shows that Muslim Americans 
are significantly less likely to prevail on free exercise claims in federal court than 
followers of other religions.8  Do we have a culture of “comparative free exercise 
success” in the making?  Do secularism and non-establishment really remove the 
jousting between religions for the approval of the state, where that approval is 
framed as a matter of judicial acceptance of religious liberty claims rather than 
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theocratic endorsement of particular faiths?  Europe’s continuing difficulties in 
integrating Muslim communities makes the American experience in this respect 
seem like a success story, but Weiler’s intervention suggests that there may be 
hidden, or at least less visible, costs to that success. 
The rich and lively symposium that follows encourages us to think hard about 
this and other questions.  I want to conclude by thanking the editors of the Maine 
Law Review for their work on this dialogue, and Professors Weiler, Prélot, and 
Marshall for revealing to us so powerfully the lingering presence of the Atlantic 
revolutionary past in the law of religious liberty. 
 
